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SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALLED FOR THE COURT TO 
ANALYZE IT ON THE ISSUE OF ENTRAPMENT. 
The appellant's brief has abundant referals to the trial 
record so that all relevant evidence has reference to it. 
II. 
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE APPELLANT ON THE ISSUE OF 
ENTRAPMENT ARE RELEVANT AND THE BEST AVAILABLE FOR THE FACTS 
IN THIS CASE. 
The cases cited involve fact situations largely similar 
to the facts in this case and resulted in reversals of the 
convictions in the trial court. 
III. 
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE APPELLEE FROM OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS IN RESISTANCE TO THE MERGER OF OFFENSES ARE NOT 
RELEVANT TO THIS CASE. 
The federal decisions under RICO and the decisions from 
the State of Indiana are not authoritative in Utah especially 
in the absence of a showing that the federal statutes and the 
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THE UTAH AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE APPELLEE ON THE ISSUE OF 
MERGER OF OFFENSES EITHER SUPPORT THE APPELLANT OR ARE NOT 
REVELANT TO THE FACTS IN THIS CASE. 
The Utah cases cited by the appellee either support the 
appellant's position on merger or the cases have different fact 




THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALLED FOR THE COURT 
TO ANALYZE IT ON THE ISSUE OF ENTRAPMENT. 
The appellant's brief contains numerous references to 
the trial record showing the relationship between the defendant 
and the undercover agents from the beginning of that relation-
ship to the end of it. (Brief of Appellant, P. 4-6). 
The record shows the efforts of D. Hook to contact and 
develope a relationship with persons from whom marijuana 
could be obtained and finally, with the aid of Raymond 
Erickson, finally resulting in a contact with the defendant. 
The record fails to show any attempt by the defendant to 
initiate a relationship with the undercover agents. 
II 
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY APPELLANT ON THE ISSUE OF 
ENTRAPMENT ARE RELEVANT AND THE BEST AVAILABLE FOR THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE. 
In the present case, the undercover agent, Daniel Hook, 
commenced his undercover work by going to a garage where 
Raymond Erickson was employed with the pretense of having 
some repairs done to his van. (Brief of Appellant, P. 4-5.). 
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Hook continued to visit Erickson at the garage and developed 
a friendly relationship with Erickson. (Brief of Appellant, 
P. 5). On two occasions, Hook smoked marijuana with Erickson 
and went to the bar with him on another occasion. (Brief of 
Appellant, P.5). During this relationship, Hook inquired of 
Erickson as to where some marijuana could be obtained. 
(Brief of Appellant, P.5). It was Erickson, as a favor 
to his friend Hook and upon the urging of Hook, who arranged 
the sale by the defendant to Hook and the sale was not initiated 
by the defendant. (Brief of Appellant, P. 5-6). After the 
first sale, the relationship was pursued by the undercover 
agents. (Brief of Appellant, P. 6). 
In the case of State vs. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404, cited in 
the Brief of Appellant herein, an undercover agent approached 
the defendant in an endeavor to obtain some marijuana. The 
agent pursued the relationship until the third contact at 
which some marijuana was purchased. The trial court convicted 
the defendant but the appellate court reversed the conviction 
because the defendant was entrapped into the offense. Sprague 
is largely similar to the present case, but the agent in the 
present case pursued a purchase through Erickson more than the 
agent did in Sprague. For the convenience of the court, a 
copy of the statement of facts from the Sprague opinion is 
a part of the Addendum to this brief. 
The case of State vs. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238, cited in 
the Brief of Appellant, also involved a purchase of a controlled 
substance by an undercover agent from the defendant, and the 
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appellate court reversed the conviction in the trial court because 
of entrapment. Again, a copy of the statement of facts from the 
opinion in that case is included in the addendum to this brief. 
The two preceeding cases are significant in that they contain 
factual situations largely similar to the present case and they are 
instances where the appellate court reversed the convictions in 
the trial court. 
III. 
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE APPELLEE IN RESISTENCE TO THE 
MERGER OF OFFENSES ARE NOT AUTHORITATIVE OR RELEVANT FOR THE 
PRESENT CASE. 
In the absence of Utah cases on the issue of predicate convic-
tions being merged into a conviction under the Utah Pattern of 
Unlawful Activities Act, UCA 76-10-1601, Et Seq, the appellee 
relies in its brief to decisions under the federal RICO statute 
and decisions from the State of Indiana. The court does not have 
before it the RICO statute or the federal statute on merging 
predicate included offenses, nor does it have before it the Indiana 
statutes to compare with the Utah UPUAA STATUTE AND Section UCA 
76-1-402. Therefore, the cases cited by the appellee are not 
authoritative, and this court must rely on its own application of 
Section 76-1-402 to the UPUAA.* The appellant continues to urge 
that her analysis of the merger issue as to included offenses 
contained in point "III" of the Legal Arguments in the Brief of 
Appellant is correct. 
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IV. 
THE UTAH AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE APPELLEE EITHER SUPPORT 
THE APPELLANTS POSITION ON MERGER OR ARE NOT RELEVANT TO THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
State vs. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, is a case in which the 
defendant was convicted of both theft and aggravated robbery 
arising out of the same incident. The trial court held that 
sentencing should be on both convictions. The Supreme Court 
held that theft is an included offense in aggravated robbery 
and that the theft conviction should be merged into the 
aggravated robbery conviction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, Section 76-1-402(3), and that the sentencing should be 
for aggravated robbery only. 
State vs. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, involved convictions 
of theft, aggravated robbery and first degree murder. The 
Supreme Court held that the test of whether or not there 
should be a merger of the lesser offenses intoj the greater 
offense is the presence of all of the statutory elements of 
the lesser offense in the elements of the greater offense. 
The court held that the theft conviction was a lesser included 
offense in the aggravated robbery conviction and that the 
aggravated robbery conviction was an included offense in the 
first degree murder conviction so that both the theft and the 
aggravated robbery ^convictions were merged - into the first 
degree murder conviction. 
In the case of State vs. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, the 
convictions were for aggravated robbery and second degree 
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felony murder. The court distinguished this case from Hill and 
Shaffer, although agreeing with the holdings, in Hill and 
Shaffer, for the reason that the victims in the two offenses 
were different, that is, the victim of the robbery was a 
different person from the victim of the murder who was merely 
a customer in the business that was robbed and was not damaged 
by the robbery. 
In State vs. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, the convictions were 
kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault and first degree murder. 
The court held that the aggravated sexual assault conviction 
merged into the first degree murder conviction because of a 
causal relationship of the assault to the murder; however, 
the kidnapping conviction was not merged because it was a 
somewhat independent incident from the other two offenses. 
In McCovey, the court stated that the intent of the 
legislature that governs and the court concluded that the legis-
lature did not intend that there be a merger where there 
were two unrelated victims. The case stands on its own facts 
and should not be accepted as a general departure from the merger 
concepts stated in Hill and Shaffer. 
There is nothing in the UPUAA that indicates an intent 
that convictions under that act should be treated differently 
from other cases under Section 76-1-402(3). The predicate 
offenses are the "episodes" required for a prosecution under 
the UPUAA and no prosecution under UPUAA is possible without 
the predicate offenses. The UPUAA adds two elements to the 
prosecution, that is, the existence of the enterprise and an 
association with the enterprise, but the UPUAA has no other 
elements except the commissiion of the predicate offenses. 
_ Q_ 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant-appellant should be granted the relief 
requested in the Brief of Appellant. 
Dated April 19, 1996. 
John 0. Christiansen, 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Appellant's 
Reply Brief upon the Plaintiff/Respondent by mailing two copies 
thereof, postage prepaid, to the Attorney for the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent on the 22nd day of April, 1996, addressed as follows: 
Ms. Jan Graham, Attorney General, State of Utah, P.O. Box 140854, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854. 
John 0. Christiansen 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
P.O. Box 1468 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
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ADDENDUM 
The statutes referred to below are in Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended; 
Section 76-10-1601, copy attached. 
Section 76-1-402, copy attached. 
Section 76-1-402(3), copy attached. 
The following are copies of the statement of facts as 
taken from the published opinions in the cases cited: 
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CRIMINAL CODE 76-10-1602 
hreatens a breach of the peace, is disorderly, or 
)scene, profane, or vulgar language on a bus; 
3 in or upon any bus while unlawfully under the 
ce of a controlled substance as defined in Section 
h 
ails to obey a reasonable request or order of a bus 
bus company representative, a nondrinking desig-
her than the driver as provided in Subsection 
«213(l)(c)(iii), or other person in charge or control 
s or terminal; 
ngests any controlled substance, unless prescribed 
lysician or medical facility, in or upon any bus, or 
intoxicating liquor in or upon any bus, except a 
•ed bus as defined and provided in Sections 32A-1-
d 41-6-44.20; or 
mokes tobacco or other products in or upon any 
cept a chartered bus. 
f person violates Subsection (1), the driver of the 
on in charge thereof may stop at the place where 
is committed or at the next regular or convenient 
ace and remove such person, using only such force 
ecessary to accomplish the removal, and the driver 
i charge may request the assistance of passengers 
the removal. The driver or person in charge may 
erson so removed to be detained and delivered to 
minorities. 1991 
Exclusion of persons without bona fide 
msiness from terminal — Firearms and dan-
gerous materials — Surveillance devices and 
leizure of offending materials — Detention of 
riolators — Private security personnel. 
ler to provide for the safety, welfare and comfort of 
a bus company may refuse admission to terminals 
son not having bona fide business within the 
ny such refusal shall not be inconsistent or con-
tte or federal laws or regulations, or to any ordi-
le political subdivision in which the terminal is 
authorized bus company representative may re-
;rson in a terminal to identify himself and state his 
ailure to comply with such request or to state an 
business purpose shall be grounds for the repre-
i request that the person depart the terminal. Any 
refuses to comply with such a request shall be 
:lass C misdemeanor. 
erson who carries a concealed dangerous weapon, 
any explosive, highly inflammable or hazardous 
r devices into a terminal or aboard a bus shall be 
bird degree felony. The bus company may employ 
means, including mechanical, electronic or x-ray 
etect such items concealed in baggage or upon the 
ly passenger. Upon the discovery of any such item, 
rmay obtain possession and retain custody thereof 
ansferred to law enforcement officers, 
thorized bus company representative may detain 
urinal or bus any person violating the provisions of 
a reasonable time until law enforcement authori-
Such detention shall not constitute unlawful 
Dt and neither the bus company nor the represen-
be civilly or criminally liable upon grounds of 
prisonment or assault, provided that only reason-
cessary force is exercised against any person so 
i company may employ or contract for private 
sonnel. Such personnel may detain within a ter-
\ any person violating the provisions of this act for 
B time until law enforcement authorities arrive, 
e reasonable and necessary force in subduing or 
ly person violating this act. 1979 
76-10-1508. Theft of baggage or cargo. 
Any person who removes any baggage, cargo or other item 
transported upon a bus or stored in a terminal without 
consent of the owner of the property or the bus company, or its 
duly authorized representative is guilty of theft and shall be 
punished pursuant to Section 76-6-412. 1979 
76-10-1509. Obstruct ing operat ion of bus. 
Any person who unlawfully obstructs or impedes by force or 
violence, or any means of intimidation, the regular operation 
of a bus is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 1979 
76-10-1510. Obstructing operation of bus — Conspir-
acy. 
Two or more persons who willfully or maliciously combine or 
conspire to violate Section 76-10-1509 shall each be guilty of a 
class C misdemeanor. 1979 
76-10-1511. Cumulative and supplemental nature of 
act. 
The provisions of this act shall be cumulative and supple-
mental to the provisions of any other law of the state. 1979 
PART 16 
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES 
76-10-1601. Short title. 
This act is the "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act." 1987 
76-10-1602. Definit ions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietor-
ship, partnership, corporation, business trust, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, 
and includes illicit as well as licit entities. 
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in 
conduct which constitutes the commission of at least three 
episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not 
isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, results, 
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or other-
wise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. 
Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continu-
ing unlawful conduct and be related either to each other 
or to the enterprise. At least one of the episodes compris-
ing a pattern of unlawful activity shall have occurred 
after July 31, 1981. The most recent act constituting part 
of a pat tern of unlawful activity as defined by this part 
shall have occurred within five years of the commission of 
the next preceding act alleged as part of the pattern. 
(3) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of 
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property, including 
state, county, and local governmental entities. 
(4) "Unlawful activity" means to directly engage in 
conduct or to solicit, request, command, encourage, or 
intentionally aid another person to engage in conduct 
which would constitute any offense described by the 
following crimes or categories of crimes, or to attempt or 
conspire to engage in an act which would constitute any of 
those offenses, regardless of whether the act is in fact 
charged or indicted by any authority or is classified as a 
misdemeanor or a felony: 
(a) assault or aggravated assault, Sections 76-5-
102 and 76-5-103; 
(b) a threat against life or property, Section 76-5-
107; 
(c) criminal homicide, Sections 76-5-201, 76-5-202, 
and 76-5-203; 
(d) kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, Sections 
76-5-301 and 76-5-302; 
76-1-301 CRIMINAL CODE 176 
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in 
any county in which he exerts control over the prop-
erty affected. 
(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the 
boundary of two or more counties, trial of the offense 
may be held in any of such counties. 
(v) For any other offense, trial may be held in the 
county in which the defendant resides, or, if he has no 
fixed residence, in the county in which he is appre-
hended or to which he is extradited. 
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a 
defendant unless made before trial. 19»4 
PART 3 
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS 
76-1-301. Capital felony, aggravated murder, murder, 
manslaughter. 
A prosecution for a capital felony, aggravated murder, mur-
der, or manslaughter may be commenced at any time. 1995 
76-1-301.5. Time l imitat ions for prosecution of misus-
ing public monies and falsification or alter-
ation of government records. 
(1) A prosecution for misusing public monies or falsification 
or alteration of government records shall be commenced 
within four years after facts constituting the offense have been 
reported to a prosecutor having responsibility and jurisdiction 
to prosecute the offense. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall operate to shorten the 
limitation of actions under Subsection 76-1-303(3). 1995 
76-1-302. Time l imitat ions for prosecution of offenses 
— Commencement of prosecution. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for: 
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced 
within four years after it is committed; 
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall 
be commenced within two years after it is committed; and 
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year 
after it is committed. 
(2) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing 
of an indictment by a grand jury or upon the filing of a 
complaint or information. 1990 
76-1-303. Time l imitat ions for fraud or breach of fidu-
ciary obl igat ion — Misconduct of public offi-
cer or employee . 
(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-302 has expired, 
a prosecution may be commenced for any offense a material 
element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary 
obligation within one year after discovery of the offense by an 
aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to 
represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not a party to 
the offense. 
(2) Subsection (1) may not extend the period of limitation as 
provided in Section 76-1-302 by more than three years. 
(3) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-301.5 or 76-1-
302 has expired, a prosecution may be commenced for: 
(a) any offense based upon misconduct in office by a 
public officer or public employee: 
(i) at any time during which the defendant holds a 
public office or during the period of his public employ-
ment; or 
(ii) within two years after termination of defen-
dant's public office or public employment. 
(b) Except as provided in Section 76-1-301.5, Subsec-
tion (3) shall not extend the period of limitation otherwise 
applicable by more than three years. 1995 
76-1-303.5. Sexual offense against a child. 
If the period prescribed in Subsection 76-1-302(1) has ex-
pired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for rape 
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual 
abuse of a child within four years after the report of the offense 
to a law enforcement agency. 1995 
76-1-304. Defendant out of state. 
The period of limitation does not run against any defendant 
during any period of time he is out of the state following the 
commission of an offense. 1973 
76-1-305. Lesser inc luded offense for which period of 
l imitat ions has run. 
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which 
the period of limitations has not run and the defendant should 
be found guilty of a lesser offense for which the period of 
limitations has run, the finding of the lesser and included 
offense against which the statute of limitations has run shall 
not be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense. 1973 
PART 4 
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder 
of offenses and defendants . 
In this part unless the context requires a different defini-
tion, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is 
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the 
effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses 
and defendants in criminal proceedings. 1995 
76-1-402. Separate offenses aris ing out of single crimi-
nal ep isode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal 
action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a 
single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provi-
sion; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such 
provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses un-
der a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise 
orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to 
separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single 
court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney 
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in 
the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the 
offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so 
included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all 
the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or 
form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an 
offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser 
included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with 
respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged 
and convicting him of the included offense. 
w CRIMINAL CODE 76-1-504 
|5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, 
Kan appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine 
mat there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
Ke offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
•Sport a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
met necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that 
Included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be 
ret aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for 
[be included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
Hief is sought by the defendant. 1974 
R§-l-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent 
jfe prosecution for offense out of same episode. 
K(l) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
Smenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent 
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of 
pe same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that 
was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-
402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment 
for the defendant that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a 
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the subsequent 
prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a 
finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination 
mat there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A 
Ending of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of 
me greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
pduded offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or va-
K(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a 
Edgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or 
Kcated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; 
Bra plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
E(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the 
prmination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not 
Amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has 
peen impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury 
Irial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, 
lamination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the 
termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the 
termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the 
trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not 
attributable to the state that would make any judg-
ment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of 
law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom 
not attributable to the state makes it impossible to 
proceed with the trial without injustice to the defen-
dant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent 
a fair trial. 1974 
W-l-404. C o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n — P r o s e c u t i o n in 
other jurisdiction barr ing prosecution in 
state. 
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one 
or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this 
state and of another jurisdiction, federal or state, the prosecu-
tion in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecu-
tion in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an 
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those 
terms are denned in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent 
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses. 1973 
76-1-405. Subsequent prosecution not barred — Cir-
cumstances. 
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not be barred 
under the following circumstances: 
(1) The former prosecution was procured by the defen-
dant without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney 
bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to 
avoid the sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or 
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of 
guilt held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on writ of 
habeas corpus, coram nobis, or similar collateral attack. 
1973 
PART 5 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the 
offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him 
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" 
mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the defini-
tion of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements 
of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 1973 
76-1-502. Negating defense by allegation or proof — 
When not required. 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or 
other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of 
evidence presented at trial, either by the prosecution 
or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the 
defendant has presented evidence of such affirmative 
defense, 1973 
76-1-503. P r e s u m p t i o n of fact. 
An evidentiary presumption established by this code or 
other penal statute has the following consequences: 
(1) When evidence of facts which support the presump-
tion exist, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact 
must be submitted to the jury unless the court is satisfied 
that the evidence as a whole clearly negates the presumed 
fact; 
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a pre-
sumed fact to the jury, the court shall charge that while 
the presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts giving rise to 
the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact. 1973 
76-1-504. Affirmative defense p r e s e n t e d by de fendan t . 
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this code or 
other statutes shall be presented by the defendant. 1973 
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We reverse and remand the case to the 
lower court for reference to the retirement 
board. 
No costs awarded. 
CROCKETT, C. J , and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
James (Jim) KOURBELAS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16875. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 28, 1980. 
Defendant was convicted before First 
District Court Cache County, VeNoy Chris-
toffersen, J., of distribution of a controlled 
substance, and defendant appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held that 
reasonable doubt necessarily existed as to 
whether offense committed was product of 
defendant's initiative and desire, or was 
induced by persistent request of undercover 
narcotics agent. 
Reversed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
1. Criminal Law <s=>37(8) 
Unless there is abuse or imposition, 
practice of using undercover agents to in-
vestigate trafficking in drugs is legitimate. 
2. Criminal Law <s=»37(l) 
Inducing persons who otherwise would 
be law-abiding into commission of crime is 
not proper function of law enforcement of-
ficers, either themselves or by use of under-
cover agents or decoys. 
3. Criminal Law ^1158(1), 1159.1 
Proper deference must be given to rul-
ings of trial court and to findings of jury; 
nevertheless, they are not to be regarded as 
so infallible as to be beyond possibility of 
error. 
4. Criminal Law <s=>37(8) 
In prosecution for sale of controlled 
substance, reasonable doubt necessarily ex-
isted as to whether offense committed was 
product of defendant's initiative and desire, 
or was induced by persistent requests of 
undercover narcotics agent where agent 
first suggested purchase of marijuana from 
defendant, agent renewed request after 
two weeks had passed and then called at 
least five times in attempting to purchase 
marijuana, and there was no evidence that 
defendant had previously possessed or dealt 
in drugs. 
David B. Havas, Ogden, for defendant 
and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Olga Ag: 
nello-Raspa, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
Defendant James Kourbelas was convicte! 
ed by a jury of distribution of a controlled^  
substance.1 He was sentenced to serve noil 
more than a five-year prison term. TK< 
sentence was suspended and he was pi; 
on probation. The issue raised on appeal 
whether the evidence of entrapment m 
sarily creates a reasonable doubt as to thi 
defendant's guilt. 
On June 13,1979, the defendant and so; 
friends were boating on Lake Powell 
Southern Utah. At the time, one 
Nelson was working as an undercover 
cotics agent for the San Juan County Shj 
iff's office and had been hired as the 
ant manager of the gas dock at the 
1. In violation of Sec, 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii), U.C.A. 
1953. 
When the defendant and 
brought their houseboat into the marina for 
refueling, there was some problem about 
the gas mixture and Mr. Nelson intervened 
to help resolve it. In his conversations with 
the defendant, Mr. Nelson brought up the 
subject of selling marijuana. He told the 
defendant that there "could be a lot of 
money made down here if I had some way 
of getting some . . " Mr. Nelson then 
asked: "Can you help me get some or do 
you know where I can get some?" When 
the defendant replied, 'Til see what I can 
do," Mr. Nelson asked for his name, address 
and telephone number. The defendant, 
who resided in North Salt Lake, gave that 
information to him and told Mr. Nelson to 
get in touch. 
About two weeks later, on June 30, 1979, 
Mr. Nelson telephoned the defendant, re-
minded him of their conversation at Lake 
Powell, and asked him if he could get some 
marijuana. According to Mr. Nelson, the 
defendant said he could and asked how 
much he wanted. When Mr. Nelson stated 
"four or five pounds," the defendant said he 
would call back later that afternoon; how-
ever, he did not do so. 
Mr. Nelson testified that he called the 
defendant two more times on June 30. 
During one of those conversations, Mr. Nel-
son said: "Hey, I hate to keep bothering 
you like this," and that the defendant re-
sponded that it was "no problem at all." 
Mr. Nelson called again the next morning 
and asked once more if the defendant could 
sell some marijuana. The defendant prom-
ised to call back. Later that same day, the 
defendant reported that he had not been 
able to contact one "Ladell" who might 
have some marijuana, but that he would 
keep trying. 
On the morning of July 2, Mr. Nelson 
again called the defendant to find out about 
the marijuana. The defendant stated he 
had spoken with Ladell and that there was 
two pounds of marijuana available. They 
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his friends discussed the price and how the defendant 
could pay Ladell and arranged to meet at 
the Sherwood Hills golf course for the ex-
change. 
When they met, the defendant suggested 
they "get inside the truck and light up some 
to see if it's good stuff." Mr. Nelson stated 
that was done and he accepted a beer from 
the defendant. After the money was ex-
changed and Mr. Nelson received the mari-
juana, officers who had the transaction un-
der surveillance appeared and placed the 
defendant under arrest. 
On the basis of the evidence, the defend-
ant moved to dismiss the case on the ground 
of entrapment, pursuant to Sec. 76-2-303, 
U.C.A.1953: 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforce-
ment officer or a person directed by or 
acting in cooperation with the officer in-
duces the commission of an offense in 
order to obtain evidence of the commis-
sion for prosecution by methods creating 
a substantial risk that the offense would 
be committed by one not otherwise ready 
to commit it. Conduct merely affording 
a person an opportunity to commit an 
offense does not constitute entrapment. 
The trial court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing on the motion2 and in commenting 
thereon stated, in part: 
The crucial question, not easy to an-
swerf to which the court must address 
itself, is whether the police conduct re-
vealed in the particular case falls below 
standards, to which common feelings re-
spond for the proper use of governmental 
power. [All emphasis added.] 
[1,2] It is well known that, due to the 
secretive nature of trafficking in drugs, it is 
common practice to use undercover agents 
to investigate such activity.3 Unless there 
is abuse or imposition, that procedure is 
recognized as legitimate.4 But it is, of 
2. Pursuant to Sec 76-2-303(4) The defendant 
renewed his motion arter the prosecution's case 
in chief. 
3. State v. Curtis, Utah, 542 P2d 744 (1975). 
4. See statements in Sorrells v United States, 
287 U S 435, 53 S Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932); 
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[1] The $800-per-month allowance 
should have been included on a payroll 
report for purposes of determining the 
amount of contributions to be paid if the 
trainees rendered to Enterprise personal 
services for wages or under a contract for 
hire. Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 99 Utah 97, 99-100, 
104 P.2d 201, 202 (1940). U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-4-7 (Supp.1983). 
[S]ervices are performed for another 
when performed under his supervision, 
direction and control, in the performance 
of the details of the work and in the use 
of the means employed; . . . when he has 
the right to hire . . . and the right to fire 
. . . and when the compensation, if any, 
accruing to the worker becomes a direct 
liability on the other party. 
Id. at 103, 104 P.2d at 203 (citation omit-
ted). The trainees enrolled in Enterprise's 
program were under the supervision, di-
rection and control of Enterprise. They 
were required to attend class. The content 
of their instruction was controlled by En-
terprise. They were directed to sell adver-
tising under the supervision of Enterprise's 
experienced salespersons. 
[2] Furthermore, as the trainees ful-
filled the requirements of the training pro-
gram, they were owed $800-per-month 
wages by Enterprise for their services. 
"Wages" is defined as all compensation 
payable for personal services, rendered 
for another under a contract of hire, 
express or implied. This compensation 
. . . is not derived from the accomplish-
ment of a purpose or achievement of an 
objective, by the person receiving the 
remuneration. 
Id., 104 P.2d at 203-04. It is thus irrele-
vant that during their field training the 
trainees sold only an insignificant amount 
of advertising for Enterprise or that they 
personally received a greater benefit from 
the training course than did Enterprise. 
The significant point is that Enterprise 
agreed to pay the trainees $800 per month 
if they would fulfill the requirements of 
the training program. The mere fulfill-
ment by the trainees of their part of the 
bargain was sufficient to create the obliga-
tion of Enterprise to pay them their wage, 
Enterprise received its benefit from the 
training program by having a ready pool oi 
skilled specialized labor to draw from anc 
by reducing its turnover through the oppor-
tunity to be more selective in its hiring, 
Enterprise presumably would have discon-
tinued the training program were it nol 
beneficial in this way. 
We hold that the trainees rendered per-
sonal services to Enterprise and that the 
payments received were wages under the 
Utah Employment Security Act. The pay-
ments are subject to unemployment contri-
butions. Affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., OAKS and HOWE, JJ., anc 
SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge, concur 
STEWART, J., does not participate here 
in; DANIELS, District Judge, sat. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Thomas Lowell SPRAGUE, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18975. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 23, 1984. 
Defendant was convicted in the Sixth 
District Court, Sanpete County, Don V. 
Tibbs, J., of distribution of a controlled 
substance, marijuana, for value, and he 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., 
held that defendant's commission of the 
offense was induced by persistent requests 
of undercover police officer, not by initia-
tive and desire of defendant, and, there-
STATE v. 
Cite as 680 P.2d 
fare, defendant's conviction was required 
be reversed. 
Reversed. 
Criminal Law e=>37(l) 
In determining whether a defendant 
Bas been "entrapped," test is whether a 
Jaw enforcement official or an agent, in 
prder to obtain evidence of the commission 
an offense, induced the defendant to 
ommit such an offense by persuasion or 
nducement which would be effective to 
Irsuade an average person, other than 
be who was merely given the opportunity 
". commit the offense. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-
803(1). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Criminal Law <s=>37(8) 
Defendant's distribution of a con-
oiled substance, marijuana, for value was 
Educed by persistent requests of undercov-
officer, not by initiative and desire of 
Befendant, and, therefore, defendant's con-
Ifction was required to be reversed, where 
ndercover officer first approached defend-
bt with no reason to believe that defend-
bt used or sold drugs, suggested the pur-
se of drugs, one week later again ap-
oached defendant with a request for mar-
Gana, which defendant again did not pro-
|de, and where, after officer's third ap-
oach to defendant, defendant provided a 
am of marijuana to officer. U.C.A.1953, 
37-8(l)(a)(ii), 76-2-303. 
ISheldon R. Carter, Provo, for defendant 
nd appellant. 
IDavid L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., J. Ste-
hen Mikita, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
Sty, for plaintiff and respondent. 
•[HALL, Chief Justice: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of dis-
bution of a controlled substance (mari-
ana) for value,1 contending that he was 
SPRAGUE Utah 405 
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entrapped and that the trial court erred in 
receiving certain evidence. We reverse. 
On August 19, 1982, around 10:00 p.m., 
defendant and a friend were sitting in a 
park-like area across from the Manti Tem-
ple, conversing. Undercover agents James 
Tauffer and Ed Spann saw the two and 
approached them to make a contact. De-
fendant and his friend were neither using 
controlled substances nor talking about 
them. Further, Tauffer had not seen ei-
ther person before and testified that he had 
no reason to believe that defendant or his 
friend were involved with drugs. Tauffer 
initiated the conversation with small talk 
and eventually turned the conversation to 
marijuana, asking defendant if he knew 
where Tauffer could get some. Defendant 
told Tauffer his best bet would be to go to 
Provo. After further discussion, defendant 
gave Tauffer his name and telephone num-
ber and told Tauffer that he could call 
defendant later. Defendant took no action 
to obtain marijuana for Tauffer, and no 
phone contacts were made by either per-
son. 
On the afternoon of August 27, 1982, 
Tauffer and Spann went to defendant's 
place of employment and asked defendant 
if he knew where Tauffer could get a quar-
ter-ounce of marijuana. Defendant told 
them that he was going to Gunnison that 
night and might be able to get some there. 
Tauffer urged a meeting, so defendant told 
Tauffer and Spann to come to Ephraim 
that night and he would find them there. 
Defendant did not go to either Gunnison or 
Ephraim. 
On August 31, 1982, Tauffer spotted de-
fendant at a cafe in Manti, pulled over and 
again approached defendant. Defendant 
told Tauffer that it was possible that he 
could get Tauffer a small amount of mari-
juana from someone else. Tauffer asked 
to see the marijuana first. Defendant left 
the cafe, returning a short time later with 
another person. Outside the cafe defend-
ant handed Tauffer a small bag containing 
one gram of marijuana. Tauffer gave de-
U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37-8(l)(a)(n). 
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fendant $10, which defendant thereafter 
gave to the person with him. 
Based on this transaction, defendant was 
charged with distributing a controlled sub-
stance for value. Defendant moved to dis-
miss the case on the ground of entrapment 
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 76-2-303. The 
judge declined to dismiss. Defendant ap-
peals his conviction. 
Section 76-2-303(1) states: 
It is a defense that the actor was en-
trapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforce-
ment officer or a person directed by or 
acting in cooperation with the officer in-
duces the commission of an offense in 
order to obtain evidence of the commis-
sion for prosecution by methods creating 
a substantial risk that the offense would 
be committed by one not otherwise ready 
to commit it. Conduct merely affording 
a person an opportunity to commit an 
offense does not constitute entrapment. 
[1] This Court has adopted the objective 
test for determining whether a defendant 
has been entrapped.2 In assessing police 
conduct under that standard, the test is 
whether "a law enforcement official or an 
agent, in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission of an offense, induced the de-
fendant to commit such an offense by per-
suasion or inducement which would be ef-
fective to persuade an average person, oth-
er than one who was merely given the 
opportunity to commit the offense." 3 
[2] Defendant relies on State v. 
Kourbelas,4 in arguing that he was en-
trapped. That reliance is well-placed. In 
Kourbelas, on facts markedly similar to 
those in this case, the Court said that there 
existed "a reasonable doubt as to whether 
the offense committed was the product of 
the defendant's initiative and desire, or was 
induced by the persistent requests of [the 
undercover agent]." 5 
2. State v. Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979). 
3. Id. at 503. 
4. Utah, 621 P.2d 1238 (1980). 
5. Id. at 1240. 
6. We also note that there was no evidence 
presented at trial that showed appellant distrib-
That language applies in this case 
well. It was Tauffer who first approach 
defendant, with no reason to believe tl 
defendant used or sold drugs, and suggesi 
ed the purchase of drugs. After a week] 
had passed, it was again Tauffer who ajy 
proached defendant with the request foS 
marijuana, which defendant did not pro| 
vide. Finally, after Tauffer approached del 
fendant a third time, defendant provided'aj 
gram of marijuana to Tauffer. Defendant 
testified that he did this because he wanted] 
to be a friend to Tauffer. 
Therefore, we conclude that the offense] 
was induced by the persistent requests \m 
Tauffer, not by the initiative and desire q| 
defendant. Accordingly, the defendant^ 
conviction is reversed. Since we reverse on; 
the issue of entrapment, we do not address; 
the issue of admissibility of evidence.6 
OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., and 
SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge, concur, 
STEWART, J., does not participate her<> 
in; DANIELS, District Judge, sat. 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM £> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Wayne Sterling PEARSON, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 19028. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 27, 1984. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, David B, 
uted marijuana for value in violation of U.Cjt, 
1953, § 58-37-8(3 ;(a)(ii). The instant cas< 
would appear to be a case of arranging to dis 
tribute a controlled substance for value in viola 
tion of U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv). Stati 
v. Ontiveros, Utah, 674 P.2d 103 (1983). 
